India’s Security Post 26/11
It is now a well-known fact that Pakistan is a terror-sponsoring state. Pakistan sees the nuclear overhang as a shield behind which it could not only continue cross-border terrorism, but also escalate its attacks to progressively higher levels, recent one’s being Pulwama and Uri. We may have to adapt counter-terrorism policies to attempt to change the strategic calculus in Islamabad. This may include the option of inflicting pain on Pakistan if India’s security is threatened, as we did post-Uri (surgical strikes) and post-Pulwama (air strikes). Coming back to 26/11, soon after the attack, the speedy life of Mumbai started with a new spirit. But New Delhi was tensed. High-level meetings started to discuss what should be our immediate response to Pakistan, and the strategy to prevent further attacks.
The then National Security Advisor (NSA), M.K. Narayanan organised the review of our military and other kinetic options with political leadership and military chiefs outlined their views to the then prime minister, Manmohan Singh. The then External Affairs minister, Pranab Mukherjee publicly said, “All options are open.” India chose not to attack Pakistan. As, by not attacking Pakistan, India was free to pursue all legal and covert means to achieve its goals of bringing its perpetrators to justice and uniting the international community to force consequences on Pakistan for its behavior. The UNSC put senior LeT members involved in the attack on sanctions’ list as terrorists. There was desperate need for radical changes in legislation and security apparatus. The political leadership did that well.
Following the 26/11 attack, a number of structural reforms were ambitiously proposed for the security set-up – notably, the establishment of NIA, the setting up of a National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), and the proposal for a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), along with several other initiatives, to enable a qualitative improvement in our counter-terrorism infrastructure and strategy.
NCTC was supposed to be aided by the NATGRID, which is supposedly networked to the databases of 21 different agencies that contain vital information and intelligence, will help plug our vulnerabilities by upgrading and enhancing our capability to detect and respond to such threats at the earliest possible time. Previously, each organistaion has its own stand alone database that cannot be accessed by others.
The defense apparatus underwent a radical overhaul. A three-tier security arrangement under which the Indian Navy and the marine police would work jointly was put in place to safeguard the maritime zones. The lead was given to the Indian Navy, which now handles the task of protecting the outer parameter. To enhance the first line of defense, Sagar Prahari Bal (Ocean Sentinels) has been established, which is well equipped with high-speed intercept vehicles, helicopters and UAV’s. The Mumbai police has moved to a new digital WAP system APCO 2S system, that allowed both seamless communication as well as communication over multiple channels. About 5,000 cameras have been installed at around 1,500 spots, the feed from which is beamed to the control room of Mumbai police. Restructuring was needed urgently.
First restructure of the security agency happened in 1968 i.e., Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) was setup by bifurcating the Intelligence Bureau (IB) due to the failure to pre-determine the 1962 and 1965 war with China and Pakistan respectively. R&AW was entrusted with the external security while IB for internal intelligence and security. After 2008, the foremost important thing happened was to create a NSG base in Mumbai, Hyderabad, Chennai, and Kolkata as early NSG base was only in Manesar (Haryana), which was far from main cities which are always on the hit-list. NSG has National Bomb Data Center (NBDC) at Manesar, which conducts post-blast studies in various parts of the country and also maintains a data bank on explosives and incidence of blasts which may be of use of security forces. Multi-Agency Center (MAC) was re-operationalised for streamlining intelligence efforts with effect from 2009. It works for counter terrorism whose mandate is to share terrorism related inputs on a day to day basis. 24×7 control rooms have been setup at MAC, Delhi. The government strengthened the provisions in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act ,1967 to combat terror financing by criminalizing the production or smuggling or circulation of high-quality counterfeit Indian currency as a terrorist act and enlarge the scope of proceeds of terrorism to include any property intended to be used for terrorism. A Terror Funding and Fake Currency (TFFC) cell has been constituted in the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to conduct focused investigation of terror funding and fake-currency cases.
Guidelines have also been issued in 2019 to states/UTs for high-quality counterfeit Indian currency notes. Training programmes are regularly conducted for the state police personnel on issues relating to combating terrorist financing. Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN) network is one of the channels of terror financing in India. FICN Coordination Group (FCORD) has been formed by the ministry of Home Affairs to share intelligence/information among the security agencies of the states/center to counter the problem of circulation of FCN. Intelligence & security agencies of the center and states work in tandem to keep a close watch on the elements involved in terror-funding activities and take action as per law. Security at the international borders has been strengthened by using new surveillance technology, deploying additional manpower for round the clock surveillance, establishing observation posts along the international borders, erection of border fencing and intensive patrolling among others. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) has been signed between India and Bangladesh to prevent and counter smuggling and circulation of fake currency notes.
Way Forward: A comprehensive strategy has to be evolved in which different stakeholders – the government, the political parties, the security agencies, the civil society, and the media – would have an important role to play. Necessary elements of such strategy should include – political consensus where all political parties must arrive at a national consensus on the need for the broad contours of such a planned strategy. Union government should have intensive interactions with the states and UTs while drawing up the national strategy, the latter would be required to do their part in close consultation with the nodal ministry of GoI. High priority must be given to development work and its actual implementation on the ground for which a clean, corruption-free and accountable administration at all levels is an imperative necessity.
It is now a well-known fact that Pakistan is a terror-sponsoring state. Pakistan sees the nuclear overhang as a shield behind which it could not only continue cross-border terrorism, but also escalate its attacks to progressively higher levels, recent one’s being Pulwama and Uri. We may have to adapt counter-terrorism policies to attempt to change the strategic calculus in Islamabad. This may include the option of inflicting pain on Pakistan if India’s security is threatened, as we did post-Uri (surgical strikes) and post-Pulwama (air strikes). Coming back to 26/11, soon after the attack, the speedy life of Mumbai started with a new spirit. But New Delhi was tensed. High-level meetings started to discuss what should be our immediate response to Pakistan, and the strategy to prevent further attacks.
The then National Security Advisor (NSA), M.K. Narayanan organised the review of our military and other kinetic options with political leadership and military chiefs outlined their views to the then prime minister, Manmohan Singh. The then External Affairs minister, Pranab Mukherjee publicly said, “All options are open.” India chose not to attack Pakistan. As, by not attacking Pakistan, India was free to pursue all legal and covert means to achieve its goals of bringing its perpetrators to justice and uniting the international community to force consequences on Pakistan for its behavior. The UNSC put senior LeT members involved in the attack on sanctions’ list as terrorists. There was desperate need for radical changes in legislation and security apparatus. The political leadership did that well.
Following the 26/11 attack, a number of structural reforms were ambitiously proposed for the security set-up – notably, the establishment of NIA, the setting up of a National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), and the proposal for a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), along with several other initiatives, to enable a qualitative improvement in our counter-terrorism infrastructure and strategy.
NCTC was supposed to be aided by the NATGRID, which is supposedly networked to the databases of 21 different agencies that contain vital information and intelligence, will help plug our vulnerabilities by upgrading and enhancing our capability to detect and respond to such threats at the earliest possible time. Previously, each organistaion has its own stand alone database that cannot be accessed by others.
The defense apparatus underwent a radical overhaul. A three-tier security arrangement under which the Indian Navy and the marine police would work jointly was put in place to safeguard the maritime zones. The lead was given to the Indian Navy, which now handles the task of protecting the outer parameter. To enhance the first line of defense, Sagar Prahari Bal (Ocean Sentinels) has been established, which is well equipped with high-speed intercept vehicles, helicopters and UAV’s. The Mumbai police has moved to a new digital WAP system APCO 2S system, that allowed both seamless communication as well as communication over multiple channels. About 5,000 cameras have been installed at around 1,500 spots, the feed from which is beamed to the control room of Mumbai police. Restructuring was needed urgently.
First restructure of the security agency happened in 1968 i.e., Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) was setup by bifurcating the Intelligence Bureau (IB) due to the failure to pre-determine the 1962 and 1965 war with China and Pakistan respectively. R&AW was entrusted with the external security while IB for internal intelligence and security. After 2008, the foremost important thing happened was to create a NSG base in Mumbai, Hyderabad, Chennai, and Kolkata as early NSG base was only in Manesar (Haryana), which was far from main cities which are always on the hit-list. NSG has National Bomb Data Center (NBDC) at Manesar, which conducts post-blast studies in various parts of the country and also maintains a data bank on explosives and incidence of blasts which may be of use of security forces. Multi-Agency Center (MAC) was re-operationalised for streamlining intelligence efforts with effect from 2009. It works for counter terrorism whose mandate is to share terrorism related inputs on a day to day basis. 24×7 control rooms have been setup at MAC, Delhi. The government strengthened the provisions in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act ,1967 to combat terror financing by criminalizing the production or smuggling or circulation of high-quality counterfeit Indian currency as a terrorist act and enlarge the scope of proceeds of terrorism to include any property intended to be used for terrorism. A Terror Funding and Fake Currency (TFFC) cell has been constituted in the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to conduct focused investigation of terror funding and fake-currency cases.
Guidelines have also been issued in 2019 to states/UTs for high-quality counterfeit Indian currency notes. Training programmes are regularly conducted for the state police personnel on issues relating to combating terrorist financing. Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN) network is one of the channels of terror financing in India. FICN Coordination Group (FCORD) has been formed by the ministry of Home Affairs to share intelligence/information among the security agencies of the states/center to counter the problem of circulation of FCN. Intelligence & security agencies of the center and states work in tandem to keep a close watch on the elements involved in terror-funding activities and take action as per law. Security at the international borders has been strengthened by using new surveillance technology, deploying additional manpower for round the clock surveillance, establishing observation posts along the international borders, erection of border fencing and intensive patrolling among others. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) has been signed between India and Bangladesh to prevent and counter smuggling and circulation of fake currency notes.
Way Forward: A comprehensive strategy has to be evolved in which different stakeholders – the government, the political parties, the security agencies, the civil society, and the media – would have an important role to play. Necessary elements of such strategy should include – political consensus where all political parties must arrive at a national consensus on the need for the broad contours of such a planned strategy. Union government should have intensive interactions with the states and UTs while drawing up the national strategy, the latter would be required to do their part in close consultation with the nodal ministry of GoI. High priority must be given to development work and its actual implementation on the ground for which a clean, corruption-free and accountable administration at all levels is an imperative necessity.
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